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Distinguishing the Various 
Functions of Effective Prison 
Oversight 
 
Michele Deitch* 
 
Editor’s Note: This speech, slightly revised for publication, 
was one of the introductory presentations made at the “Opening 
Up a Closed World: What Constitutes Effective Prison 
Oversight?” conference held at the University of Texas in April 
2006. 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the challenges in organizing a conference—or an 
edited volume of papers—on prison oversight is that the term 
“oversight” is hardly a term of art.  While the phrase is often 
used, there has been little effort made either on the part of 
professionals or in the literature to understand what is meant 
by those words. 
I thought it would be helpful as we begin this endeavor if 
we could identify and work from a shared analytic framework, 
and to create a common terminology to guide our thinking and 
discussions as we move forward. 
While the conference and this volume highlight the 
importance of oversight, any discussion of this issue in the 
correctional context must begin with the recognition that 
oversight is not a goal in and of itself.  Rather, oversight is a 
means of achieving the twin objectives of transparency of 
public institutions and accountability for the operation of safe 
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and humane prisons and jails.  My own professional 
experiences have persuaded me that “oversight” does not come 
in one flavor, and that it is neither desirable nor effective to 
adopt a “one size fits all” strategy.  There can be—and should 
be—many different effective ways to identify and correct safety 
problems in correctional institutions, and to increase public 
awareness.  In combination, these mechanisms can work to 
provide the levels of transparency and accountability that 
public institutions demand. 
I should mention at the outset that I am referring to 
external oversight mechanisms, that is, to entities that exist 
outside the correctional agency.  While it is critical that prisons 
and jail systems have their own internal accountability 
mechanisms—for identifying problems, informing management 
about these concerns, and addressing wrongdoing—such 
internal measures do not provide public accountability.  
Moreover, most internal review processes are designed to 
remain confidential.  They support the needs of management 
for information and accountability without being designed to 
further the additional goal of public transparency. 
 
“Oversight” as an Umbrella Concept 
 
It might be helpful if we begin to frame the concept of 
“prison oversight” as a catch-all, umbrella term that refers to at 
least seven distinct functions: 
 
 Regulation 
 Audit 
 Accreditation 
 Investigation 
 Legal 
 Reporting 
 Inspection/Monitoring 
 
I would argue that each of these functions is an essential—but 
separate—part of effective prison oversight.  Each contributes 
to the overall goals of transparency and accountability—
sometimes to one of these goals and sometimes to both.  But 
there should be a variety of separate mechanisms in place to 
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serve each of these functions.  While there are certainly some 
examples of hybrid models combining two or three of these 
functions, it would be a mistake to seek to combine all these 
functions within one entity.  No one entity can meaningfully 
serve every function, if for no reason other than the fact that 
there are different constituencies involved with regard to each 
function. 
The problem is that when we speak of “oversight,” we tend 
to merge these concepts and assume that they are in 
competition with each other when it comes to which is “most 
effective.”  Moreover, we each have in mind a different one of 
these functions when we talk about oversight, which makes 
communication about these issues very difficult: we are often 
talking at cross-purposes.  I think we need to begin to talk 
about these as separate functions, and consider how to make 
each of these specific functions as strong and effective as 
possible. 
 
Distinguishing the Discrete Functions of  
Correctional Oversight 
 
Let me be more precise about the key differences I see 
among each of these oversight functions, with particular 
emphasis on the least known of these—the 
inspection/monitoring function. 
The regulation function is served by those governmental 
entities that have some ability to wield a hammer over the 
correctional agency.  Those entities may license correctional 
facilities or set mandatory standards or policies, and they have 
the power to enforce these standards and policies through, for 
example, the imposition of fines, the ability to close an 
institution, or the ability to hire or fire directors.  Similarly, 
legislative bodies also serve a regulation function, since they 
control the operations of the agency through the passage of 
laws and the ability to control the purse strings of the agency.  
The key concepts at work here are “enforcement authority” and 
“control.” 
The audit function is concerned with whether the agency 
is meeting established performance indicators, standards, or 
policies, or whether it is being fiscally responsible.  While we 
typically think of audits as focused on financial issues, many 
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auditing bodies similarly audit agency performance.  The 
standards against which audits are conducted could be 
performance indicators mandated by the legislature, standards 
required by an accreditation body such as the ACA, generally 
accepted accounting standards, or even requirements or 
procedures set by the agency itself.  Audits could be as simple 
as a paper review involving a checklist, or they could be a more 
complex audit to see if an agency is worthy of accreditation.  
They could be either comprehensive or focused on just a single 
issue.  But as a general matter, the auditing function is 
designed to give either prison administrators or those who 
regulate or accredit them some objective measures of how the 
agency is doing and/or whether tax monies are being well-
spent.  The emphasis is on the audit as a management tool: are 
agency staff following established policy or standards?  Is there 
any gap between policy and practice?  Are statistics changing 
over time and, if so, why?  Answers to those questions are very 
valuable to prison administrators and they aid in effective and 
proactive prison management.  But audits do not necessarily 
focus on the treatment of prisoners or even on issues of direct 
concern to prisoners. 
The accreditation function is a form of oversight insofar 
as it requires an agency to meet certain standards in order to 
be eligible to receive what amounts to a stamp of approval by a 
professional organization in the field.  As the standards 
developed by these professional organizations (such as the 
American Correctional Association and the National 
Commission on Correctional Health Care) have become more 
performance-based in recent years, accreditation has become 
more meaningful as a form of correctional oversight.  
Accreditation is designed to measure an agency’s specific 
operations against best practices in the field, rather than to 
assess whether any wrongdoings or human rights violations 
have occurred.  It is also a relatively static form of oversight, as 
it is based on a snapshot view of the facility at a particular 
point in time.  Accreditation is typically a voluntary process in 
the correctional context, which means that it is initiated from 
within the agency, and the agency under review usually pays 
for the accreditation process.  Accreditation is often associated 
with an audit of the facility to assess institutional compliance 
with the applicable standards.  There is little transparency 
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associated with the accreditation process, as reports of 
accreditation audits—and any determination not to accredit a 
facility—are typically not made public. 
Investigations are a critical aspect of oversight because 
they offer a means to ensure accountability for wrongdoing.  
This function can encompass everything from an ombudsman’s 
investigation of a prisoner’s complaint, to an inspector 
general’s review of an excessive use of force claim, to an 
independent commission’s review of agency operations in the 
wake of a series of complaints, to criminal prosecution of staff 
for official misconduct.  What distinguishes the investigation 
function from some of the other oversight functions is that it is 
essentially reactive.  The function is only triggered once a 
complaint is received or a scandal breaks. 
The legal function involves the use of the courts and the 
legal process to achieve redress for wrongdoing as well as 
corrective action.  In conjunction with a lawsuit over prison 
conditions or mistreatment of prisoners, a court may order 
either damages or injunctive relief, and it can back up its 
orders with legal sanctions such as contempt or fines.  In rare 
cases, of course, the courts have exercised long-term 
supervision over correctional agencies to ensure compliance 
with orders.  Federal law also allows for the involvement of and 
oversight by the United States Department of Justice at a 
stage prior to the filing of a lawsuit, under the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).  A CRIPA investigation 
of poor correctional conditions may lead to an agreed-upon set 
of standards that the agency must meet and to long-term 
monitoring by the Justice Department to assess compliance 
with these standards.  The legal function, like the investigation 
function, is reactive in nature, though the ongoing supervision 
of the legal system is designed to fix an unacceptable set of 
conditions and not just punish wrongdoing.  Transparency may 
be a by-product of court oversight, but it is not the primary 
goal. 
The reporting function refers to the role of the media, 
human rights groups, and temporary commissions in exposing 
prison conditions or investigating a particular incident.  
Through news articles and reports, these entities shine a light 
on the closed world of correctional facilities.  This function goes 
to the heart of the goal of transparency, of course, because it 
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increases public awareness of prison-related issues.  In some 
cases, this can lead to public pressure on elected or appointed 
officials to change policies or practices, so it potentially serves 
the goal of accountability as well.  Typically, those who perform 
this oversight function do not have the ability to demand access 
to prisons, so information has to be gathered through other 
means.  The distinguishing feature of the reporting function is 
that it primarily serves the needs of the public for information 
and analysis of prison conditions. 
Finally, there is the inspection and monitoring 
function, which is perhaps least familiar of all the oversight 
functions and thus most in need of our attention at this 
conference.  Monitoring involves an entity outside of the 
corrections agency with the power and the mandate to 
routinely inspect all correctional institutions in a jurisdiction—
not just those with publicized problems—and to report publicly 
on how people within each prison or jail facility are treated.  
More so than any other oversight function, the 
inspection/monitoring function is intended to be preventative in 
nature.  (In contrast, investigations, for example, are focused 
on past behavior, and accreditation provides a snapshot.)  
Routine and regular reviews of every institution allow 
problems to be identified (and hopefully corrected) before there 
are lawsuits about conditions or incidents that make the front 
page of the newspaper.  Regular monitoring helps keep the 
quality of correctional services high, because the staff’s 
knowledge that an inspector could arrive at any time acts as a 
means of informal control over staff behavior.  In other words, 
it “keeps staff on their toes” and helps them avoid complacency, 
even when everything is going well.  Monitoring is not about 
blame for past mistakes, it is about preventing occurrences in 
the future and about improving the current state of the 
correctional facilities.  It is about finding ways for the agency 
and outside stakeholders to meet agreed-upon goals.  Notably, 
the monitoring function does not necessarily have an 
enforcement mechanism (unlike a regulatory body); the 
recommendations of an inspector are advisory in nature.  The 
monitor’s strength comes from the power of persuasion, not 
control. 
Another distinguishing feature of the inspection function is 
that the emphasis is on how prisoners are treated and how 
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prison life affects them.  The monitor looks holistically at 
interactions and institutional cultures that are not always 
captured by standards and policies, or even by performance 
measures.  Similarly, an inspector does not rely too heavily on 
general statistical measures for his assessments, given that 
aggregate statistics can sometimes mask the fact that 
appropriate treatment or services may have been denied to 
certain prisoners or groups of prisoners.  External scrutiny of 
this type helps reassure citizens that prison and jail conditions 
are appropriate and consistent with constitutional 
requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In sum, oversight should be thought of as an umbrella 
concept rather than as a word with a single meaning.  A robust 
system of correctional oversight is one that is multi-faceted and 
multi-layered, serving each of the seven critical functions, and 
is one that involves numerous players both inside and outside 
the correctional agency.  It involves sound internal 
accountability measures, complemented by credible and 
effective forms of external scrutiny.  Systems of internal review 
offer a valuable management information tool for 
administrators, allowing them to identify and correct 
operational problems at an early stage.  At the same time, 
however, external scrutiny is essential any time that a closed 
institution is responsible for the control of individuals.  Such 
transparency provides both a form of protection from harm and 
an assurance that rights will be vindicated.  External oversight 
also benefits administrators by providing them with the 
objective feedback they need about their performance.  Internal 
accountability measures and external forms of oversight are 
neither in competition nor mutually exclusive; they are 
designed to meet entirely different—but complementary—
needs. 
Most corrections professionals and most advocates for 
prisoners would find common ground in their belief that 
prisons and jails should be safe and humane places that respect 
inmates’ constitutional rights.  Effective oversight allows both 
the public and correctional administrators to know whether 
that goal is being met.  As we continue to discuss the 
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importance of prison oversight, I hope we can keep in mind 
that the best way to ensure that oversight is effective is to 
ensure that each of these critical functions is being served 
effectively, through whatever oversight mechanisms exist in a 
particular jurisdiction.  Readers need to ask themselves 
whether each of these functions is served in their own 
jurisdictions, or whether there is too great a reliance on a 
particular function, perhaps to the exclusion of all others.  We 
should not be comparing and contrasting the value of different 
oversight functions, but rather encouraging the development of 
a range of both effective internal accountability measures and 
robust external oversight mechanisms.  Public institutions—
and correctional facilities in particular—demand such 
transparency and accountability. 
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